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An Unconstitutional Response to
Citizens United
MANDATING SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF
CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURES
In accepting corporate money, I promise to respect federal election
laws the same way I respect the must-shower-before-swimming law
at the Y. As a candidate, I am under no obligation to promote the
zesty, robust taste of Doritos brand tortilla chips regardless of how
great a snack they may be for lunchtime, munch time, anytime.
–Stephen Colbert1

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Colbert, the host of a satirical political news show,
The Colbert Report,2 took some significant steps toward
running for President of the United States in the 2008 election.3
Although Mr. Colbert’s candidacy was sardonic in nature, the
real steps he took toward procuring a spot on the ballot in
South Carolina brought the potential of sanction by the Federal
Election Commission (FEC).4 Doritos, manufactured by
PepsiCo, Inc. (PepsiCo), sponsored Mr. Colbert on Comedy
Central at the time he launched his purported candidacy in
2007.5 A former FEC general counsel stated that PepsiCo’s
sponsorship of Mr. Colbert’s show, and ostensibly of his

1

Rick Klein, No Joke: Colbert’s Campaign May Run Afoul of Law, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=3766656.
2
Clifford A. Jones, The Stephen Colbert Problem: The Media Exemption for
Corporate Political Advocacy and the “Hail to the Cheese Stephen Colbert Nacho Cheese
®
Doritos 2008 Presidential Campaign Coverage,” 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 296
n.2 (2008).
3
Jacques Steinberg, Colbert Consulted Parties Before Announcing Run, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at E2.
4
Klein, supra note 1.
5
Jones, supra note 2, at 299. Professor Jones notes that “[t]here was apparently
no actual sponsorship and Pepsi[C]o, maker of Nacho Cheese Doritos, paid no consideration
for being featured in the ‘campaign.’” Id. at 299 n.17 (citing Richard L. Hasen, Stephen
Colbert’s “Hail to the Cheese” Presidential Candidacy: Why the Comedian’s Campaign Raises
Serious Questions About the Role of Corporate Money in Elections, FINDLAW.COM (Nov. 9,
2007), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20071109_hasen.html).
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candidacy, raised “serious questions.”6 One question was
whether PepsiCo’s sponsorship violated federal campaignfinance laws that—at the time—barred corporations from
directly contributing to candidates or making independent
political expenditures from their corporate treasuries.7 Just a
few years later, the legal landscape regulating corporate
political activity has changed drastically.
When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. FEC8
on January 21, 2010, it caused a major shift in campaign-finance
law.9 In that seminal decision, the Court held a ban on independent
corporate political expenditures10 to be unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.11 Specifically, the Court held that Congress may
not ban political speech on the basis of “the corporate identity of the
speaker and the content of the political speech.”12 As a result of the
five-to-four decision, corporations may now legally use their general
treasuries to fund political advertising or make other independent
political expenditures.13
Within this new paradigm, PepsiCo could seemingly pay
for an advertisement that featured Mr. Colbert’s candidacy
6

Klein, supra note 1 (quoting Lawrence M. Noble, counsel at Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP); see also Jones, supra note 2, at 307-09.
7
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
8
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). This note takes no position as to the wisdom of the
majority opinion in Citizens United. Rather, the focus of this note is to evaluate
legislative proposals in light of the decision.
9
See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010)
(“Citizens United . . . represents the Roberts Court’s clear reversal of [the trend of
expansion of campaign finance regulation] and a narrow focus on quid pro quo
corruption as the exclusive grounds for government regulation.”); Molly J. Walker
Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2365, 2392 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the Citizens United decision does
more than to give corporate interests a place at the table. It gives them a place at the
head of the table and a bullhorn.”); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate
Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (Citizens United was a “sharp
doctrinal shift”). Although Citizens United essentially extended the same theoretical
framework announced in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), the
practical implications of the Citizens United decision were extremely broad.
10
2 U.S.C. § 441b; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b makes it a
felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly
advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications
within [thirty] days of a primary election and [sixty] days of a general election.”).
11
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
12
Id. at 913; see also Jeremy R. Peterman, Note, PACs Post-Citizens United:
Improving Accountability and Equality in Campaign Finance, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160,
1179-80 (2011).
13
WHITAKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41096, LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1-2 (2010),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41096.pdf; R. SAM GARRETT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41054, CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1-2 (2010),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41054_20100201.pdf.
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(should he run in 2012) and perhaps also feature Doritos-brand
tortilla chips, so long as PepsiCo made the expenditure
independently and not in coordination with Mr. Colbert.14 If
PepsiCo were to fund such an advertisement, its shareholders
could take issue with corporate spending on advertising that
featured Mr. Colbert’s candidacy.15 Surely, some shareholders
would not want PepsiCo to wade into politics and others might
oppose Mr. Colbert’s candidacy, whether satirical or not. In Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed the
interests of shareholders by stating that “the procedures of
corporate democracy”16 could deal with such concerns.
14

Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has suggested that the Supreme Court will go
even further in extending political speech rights to corporations in the near future and
“hold that corporations have the right to contribute money to candidates for elective
office . . . .” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of the First Amendment, 46 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 623, 638 (2010). If Dean Chemerinsky’s prediction comes true, then the direct
corporate sponsorship of a political campaign would have constitutional protection. In a
recent decision, a district court held the ban on companies’ direct contributions to federal
candidates to be unconstitutional. United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85 (JCC), 2011
WL 2161794, at *19 (E.D. Va. May 26, 2011) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)); see also
Nathan Koppel, Judge Rules Ban on Corporate Campaign Contributions
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (May 27, 2011, 2:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2011/05/27/judge-rules-ban-on-corporate-campaign-contributions-unconstitutional/.
However, Professor Hasen has written that he expects the Danielczyk decision to be
reversed on appeal. Rick Hasen, Federal District Court, in Criminal Case, Holds that
Ban on Direct Corporate Contributions to Candidates Is Unconstitutional Under
Citizens United, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 26, 2011, 9:58 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/
?p=18342.
15
See Justin J. Wert, Ronald Keither Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of
Benedick and Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign of the Laggard Court, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 726-27 (2011) (“Taking controversial and highly visible
political stands can potentially cost clients and therefore lead to financial costs.
Corporate stocks and corporate products have been punished by consumers for overt
political activity . . . . A rise in overt, direct political action by most corporations carries
with it risks far exceeding the political gains that might be achieved by acting through
other agents.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and
Corporate Political Speech: Did the Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or
Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 95-96 (2010) (“[C]orporations are
constrained by the potential reaction of customers, employees, shareholders, public
interest groups, and non-governmental organizations to open advocacy. Unseemly
corporate campaigning may result in loss of customers, employee dissatisfaction, or
shareholder agitation in the form of proxy fights.” (footnotes omitted)).
16
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). But see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaigning,
FORBES.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/28/corporatecampaign-politics-legal-opinions-contributors-ciara-torres-spelliscy.html. This note does
not challenge the constitutionality of shareholders sua sponte restricting their
corporation’s spending on political endeavors. However, one commentator has pointed
out that while “a shareholder could simply dissociate himself from a corporation should
its expressed political ideals conflict with his own,” the shareholder might already have
been harmed “by the time a shareholder first learns his political views conflict with
those disseminated by the corporation.” Alex Osterlind, Note, Giving a Voice to the
Inanimate: The Right of a Corporation to Political Free Speech, 76 MO. L. REV. 259, 281
(2011); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder
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In the wake of the Citizens United decision, academics,17
think tanks,18 and legislators19 have put forth many proposals in
an attempt to counteract the increased potential for corporate
political involvement that has resulted from the Supreme
Court’s “robust conception of corporate political speech.”20
Although shareholder-driven governance will certainly be
permitted to direct corporations in this arena as the
shareholders see fit, some members of Congress and think
tanks have proposed to make this voluntary procedure
mandatory.21 Three prominent proposals would make
significant changes to the federal securities laws and would
mandate shareholder approval of a corporation’s political
expenditures,22 similar to the current campaign-finance law in

Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 58 (2009),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2009/10/15/pollman.html (concluding that “lack of
stockholder assent to corporate political speech is more compelling than ever”).
17
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Governance After ‘Citizens United,’
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2010, at col. 2.
18
See, e.g., Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Party Provision in “Disclose”
Bill Is a Plus; It Could Be Made Better (May 4, 2010), available at
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-05-04/Party_Provision_In_DISCLOSE_Bill_Is_
a_Plus_It_Could_Be_Made_Better.aspx; Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., Legal
Center Offers Possible Legislative Fixes to Citizens United at Request of Senate Committee
(Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=897:pr3834&catid=63:legal-center-press-releases&Itemid=61;
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders a Voice,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/54a676e481f019bfb8_
bvm6ivakn.pdf [hereinafter Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending].
19
See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 13, at 2-7; Jonathan Alter, High-Court
Hypocrisy, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 1585183; Democrats
Move to Blunt Citizens United Ruling, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2010, 11:47 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36303.html; David D. Kirkpatrick, Democrats
Try to Rebuild Campaign-Spending Barriers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/us/politics/12citizens.html?_r=1.
20
Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings
in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17, 17 (May 15, 2010),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/election-law/addressingpolitical-captive-audience-workplace-meetings-in-the-post%11citizens-united-environment/.
Professor Hasen has referred to the Court’s approach as “a kind of First Amendment
absolutism . . . .” Richard L. Hasen, Un-American Influence: Could Foreign Spending on
Elections Really Be Illegal?, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2270662/. For a list of proposals related to Citizens United, see Comment, Citizens
United v. FEC: Corporate Political Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 75, 81 n.62 (2010).
21
Some commentators have argued that the fears that these proposals seek
to address are “overblown, or at the very least misstated” because, in part, “the
corporate . . . moneys that are opened up for use by the Citizens United decision do not
exist in a vacuum, sitting in a massive Scrooge McDuck money vault. These moneys,
whether from profits or member dues, also have other obligations . . . . Political
activities must be balanced against a variety of other needs and priorities for
institutional money.” Wert et al., supra note 15, at 722-23.
22
See infra Part III.
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the United Kingdom.23 For example, the Brennan Center for
Justice urges Congress to amend the federal securities laws by
“mandating that corporations obtain the consent of
shareholders before making political expenditures.”24
Lively and divisive political debate has long centered on
the interpretation of the First Amendment in the context of
political campaign finance. Because the outcome of this debate
will have an unquantifiable impact on the future elections of
our national leaders—and will dictate upon whom those
leaders may rely for financial support—many factions pull in
different directions in an attempt to shape the ongoing
interpretation of the First Amendment in the corporatepolitical-speech context.25 The proponents of the proposals that
mandate shareholder approval of political expenditures urge an
unrealistically narrow interpretation of Citizens United.
Although their authors have noble goals, the proposals are
unconstitutional under Citizens United and other First
Amendment jurisprudence.26

23

Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 16;
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the
U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Abolhassan Jalilvand & Tassos Malliaris eds.) (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 49-53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474421 [hereinafter
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending]. For an in-depth discussion of the
British approach to political advertising, see Alexander Boer, Note, Continental Drift:
Contextualizing Citizens United by Comparing the Diverging British and American
Approaches to Political Advertising, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 97-99 (2011).
24
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21; see
also Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 59).
For a similar proposal, see Ronald Gilson & Michael Klausner, Corporations Can Now
Fund Politicians. What Should Investors Do?, FORBES, Mar. 29, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 5423725 (“The answer is to mandate that corporations let stockholders vote
annually on whether they want the company to exercise the rights that Citizens United
gave them to get into political races. Managers who seek stockholder approval of
political activity would explain the actions they intend to take, how those actions would
be in stockholders’ interests and what the cost will be.”).
25
Scholars and experts agree that the Citizens United decision has
significantly impacted the legal and political landscape, but its effects have yet to be
fully felt or understood. E.g., Christopher Beam, Ad Hominem: How Much Has the
Citizens United Case Changed Campaign Finance in 2010?, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2010, 6:09
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2270036/ (“No doubt Citizens United set back the cause of
campaign finance reform. But the jury is still out on its practical effects.”).
26
See WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 8 (“The practicalities of when to require
[shareholder] votes . . . may need to be carefully considered in order not to run afoul of
corporate freedom of speech rights defined by the Supreme Court in Citizens United.”).
The proposals could only be found constitutional if the Supreme Court overruled the
very case and doctrine that the proposals seek to “remedy.” The proposals, while wellintentioned and logical, also raise several policy and practical issues that would make
their implementation difficult or counterproductive. This note will not address these
issues due to space limitations.

346

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

Part I of this note provides a brief historical overview of
campaign-finance law as applied to corporations before Citizens
United. Part II discusses the Citizens United decision and its
effects on the legal and political landscape regarding corporate
contributions and expenditures. Part III provides an outline of
three proposals that would require mandatory shareholder
approval of independent political expenditures by corporations.
Part IV offers a critique of the proposals through an analysis
under Citizens United and other First Amendment jurisprudence.
Finally, this note concludes that mandatory shareholder approval
of political expenditures by corporations is not a constitutional
response to the potential problems created by Citizens United.

I.

PRE-CITIZENS UNITED LANDSCAPE

Although Citizens United is undoubtedly the new leading
case in the area of campaign-finance law,27 several earlier cases
remain good law and will likely bear upon the Court’s analysis of
the mandatory shareholder-approval proposals. Since Citizens
United overruled two cases, proper consideration of the current
doctrine requires an understanding of the historical doctrine.
The Supreme Court first recognized the political speech
rights of corporations in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,28 where it struck down a state statute that banned
corporate political expenditures on referenda unrelated to that
corporation’s proprietary interests.29 The Court found that, for
the purposes of independent expenditures on referenda,
corporations had the same free speech rights as individuals.30
With regard to analysis in future cases, the Court stated that
“extending constitutional guarantees to a corporation depends
upon ‘the nature, history, and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision.’”31 The Court also noted that free
27

See Breanne Gilpatrick, Removing Corporate Campaign Finance
Restrictions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 419 (2011) (“The effect of Citizens United already is
being felt in federal courtrooms around the country as judges and lawyers come to see
the decision as a dramatic shift in how the Court views campaign finance laws.”).
28
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“In cases
where corporate speech has been denied the shelter of the First Amendment, there is
no suggestion that the reason was because a corporation rather than an individual or
association was involved.” (citations omitted)).
29
Id. at 779, 791-92; see also Matthew Lambert, Beyond Corporate Speech:
Corporate Powers in a Federalist System, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 20, 21 (2010).
30
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 & n.15.
31
Lambert, supra note 29, at 22 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14).
Importantly, Citizens United viewed Bellotti as one of the bases for its jurisprudential
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speech is “indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and
this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation.”32
Eight years later, the Supreme Court took a more
equivocal and complicated approach to corporate political
expenditures in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL).33 Unlike Bellotti, which involved a for-profit corporation
that sought to influence votes for a referendum, MCFL resolved
a First Amendment challenge from a nonprofit corporation that
sought to influence an election for political office. In MCFL, the
Court held that the government could not ban ideological
nonprofits, which do not take corporate or union contributions,
from spending their treasury funds on explicit political advocacy
because no risk of dissenting shareholders existed.34
The next major case to bear upon the issue of the
political rights of corporations was Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.35 In Austin, the plaintiffs challenged a
path. For example, the Citizens United Court pointed to Bellotti as reaffirming the
First Amendment “principle that Government lacks the power to ban corporations from
speaking.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
32
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (footnote omitted). Commentators have also noted
that “[alt]hough the Court took an expansive view of corporate free speech rights, it
added an important footnote, footnote 26, stating that ‘Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent
expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.’” Richard L. Hasen,
Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 587-88 (2011); see
also Wilson, supra note 9, at 2371.
33
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
34
Id. at 262-63; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891 (“[T]he Court
found unconstitutional § 441b’s restrictions on corporate expenditures as applied to
nonprofit corporations that were formed for the sole purpose of promoting political
ideas, did not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from forprofit corporations or labor unions.” (citations omitted)); Hasen, supra note 32, at 58788; Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic Process, 18 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 552 (2010); J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving Buckley:
Creating a Stable Campaign Finance Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1093 n.105
(2010); Stephan Stohler, Comment, One Person, One Vote, One Dollar? Campaign
Finance, Elections, and Elite Democratic Theory, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1257, 1262 n.33
(2010). The Court also held that a federal prohibition on corporate and union treasury
spending could only apply to express advocacy. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (“We therefore hold that an expenditure must constitute ‘express
advocacy’ in order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b.”). In Citizens United, the
Court found that the MCFL “exemption” did not apply because “some of the funds
[Citizens United used] . . . were donations from for-profit corporations.” Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 891.
35
See generally Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913
(“Austin is overruled . . . effectively invalidat[ing] not only BCRA Section 203, but also
2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686,
694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that Citizens United overruled Austin).
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state law that banned corporations from using funds from their
general treasuries to make independent expenditures on behalf
of, or in opposition to, state electoral candidates.36 The Austin
Court upheld the state law on the basis of a fear that
corporations could distort the political process because “the
unique state-conferred corporate structure . . . facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries . . . [that] can unfairly influence
elections when . . . deployed in the form of independent
After
Austin,
corporations
had
no
expenditures.”37
constitutional right to make independent campaign
expenditures out of their general treasuries, but they could still
expend treasury funds on issue advocacy that mentioned specific
candidates.38 For example, corporations could not fund
advertisements that urged citizens to vote for or against a
candidate in a federal election, but corporations could fund
advertisements that urged constituents to contact a specific
legislator regarding a particular cause to express support or
disapprobation.39

36

Austin, 494 U.S. at 654.
Id. at 660. Professor Hasen notes that although the Court explains this
opinion with “an anti-corruption rationale, Austin’s emphasis on preventing distortion
of the electoral process through large corporate spending suggested the Court in fact
was espousing an equality rationale . . . .” Hasen, supra note 32, at 588 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). It has also been noted that with its decision in
Austin, “the Court moved beyond [a] focus on quid pro quo corruption to embrace
broader theories” such as “a different type of corruption: ‘the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.’” Abraham, supra note 34, at 1086 (quoting Austin, 494
U.S. at 659-60); see also Wilson, supra note 9, at 2371-72.
38
James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United v. FEC: “Precisely
What WRTL Sought to Avoid,” 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 32.
39
Excellent examples of these so-called “issue advocacy” advertisements from
the 1996 presidential campaign abound. Although it is not a corporation, the AFL-CIO
ran one advertisement titled “No Way” that included this voice-over:
37

[Woman]: My husband and I both work. And next year, we’ll have two
children in college. And it will be very hard to put them through, even with
the two incomes.
Announcer: Working families are struggling. But Congressman [X] voted
with Newt Gingrich to cut college loans, while giving tax breaks to the
wealthy. He even wants to eliminate the Department of Education. Congress
will vote again on the budget. Tell Congressman [X], don’t write off our
children’s future.
[Woman]: Tell him, his priorities are all wrong.
DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 11
(1997), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Political_
Communication/Advertising_Research_1997/REP16.PDF.
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In 2002, Congress reacted to this line of cases in an
attempt to increase restrictions on both corporate and private
funding of campaigns and independent political expenditures.
Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA) and altered the campaign-finance regulatory
landscape.40 The BCRA, in relevant part, banned the use of
corporate treasury funds to pay for “electioneering
communication[s]” during certain preelection time periods,
such as thirty days before a primary election or sixty days
before a general election.41 Professor Hasen has explained that
“[e]lectioneering communications are television or radio (not
print or Internet) advertisements that feature a candidate for a
federal election; they are capable of reaching 50,000 people in
the relevant electorate . . . .”42 In addition, the BCRA preserved
the ability of corporations to establish political action
committees (PACs) that could solicit and accept contributions
from a limited class of individuals, including employees and
shareholders.43 McConnell v. FEC44 consolidated the multiple
lawsuits that challenged this section of the BCRA on First
Amendment grounds. In McConnell, the Court held the ban
constitutional, because corporations and unions would “remain
free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for
[the] purpose” of funding electioneering communications.45
Importantly, the Court also noted that “Congress’s power to
prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their
treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the
election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been
firmly embedded in our law.”46
Prior to Citizens United, the Supreme Court most
recently grappled with the First Amendment implications of
40

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36
U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
41
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006).
42
Hasen, supra note 32, at 588-89; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
43
See 11 C.F.R. § 100.6 (2010).
44
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
45
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 894
(“McConnell permitted federal felony punishment for speech by all corporations,
including nonprofit ones, that speak on prohibited subjects shortly before federal
elections.”). McConnell relied heavily on Austin in its analysis and reasoning. Id. at 913
(“The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion interest in Austin . . . .”); see also
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 38, at 33 (“[McConnell] simply relied on Austin . . . .”);
Wilson, supra note 9, at 2372.
46
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203.
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limiting corporate political expenditures in FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life47 (WRTL). WRTL involved a nonprofit
organization’s challenge to the BCRA’s ban on the use of
corporate funds for “electioneering communications” during
certain preelection time periods—the very provision upheld in
McConnell.48 WRTL planned to broadcast radio advertisements
within thirty days of a primary election that would call on
Wisconsin’s U.S. Senators to stop delaying a vote on President
George W. Bush’s judicial nominees.49 Despite the Court’s
purported affirmation of McConnell, the Court construed
“express advocacy” very narrowly and held that “BCRA § 203
[was] unconstitutional as applied to WRTL’s [advertisements],”
because the advertisements exemplified issue advocacy, not
express advocacy.50 This decision acted as a harbinger of the
hard-line, antiregulation approach to corporate political
expenditures that would become the new paradigm.51

II.

CITIZENS UNITED

On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court decided
Citizens United v. FEC,52 in which it struck down the ban on
independent corporate political expenditures53 on First
Amendment grounds.54 Specifically, the Court held that the
laws banning corporations from using treasury funds for
“electioneering communications” unconstitutionally silenced
political speech.55 The decision extended constitutional
47

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
Id. at 455-56; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207.
Because the challenge only regarded the BCRA’s application to WRTL’s specific
situation, it was an “as-applied” challenge. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456.
49
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 458-59.
50
Id. at 481. Professor Hasen notes that although it was not facially
invalidated by the Court, “[t]he new functional equivalency test appeared likely to
eviscerate [BCRA] § 203.” Hasen, supra note 32, at 590.
51
See James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign
Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
673, 679-81 (2011) (“Soon after its ruling in McConnell, the Court watered down its
holding on corporate and union spending by approving an as-applied challenge to the
very provision of BCRA it had recently upheld.” (citing Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at
456)); Zipkin, supra note 34, at 556.
52
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
53
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b
makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—
either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast
electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a
general election.”).
54
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
55
Id. at 913.
48
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protection to corporations’ ability to use general-treasury funds
to make independent political expenditures that are not
coordinated with candidates for office.56
A.

The Facts

Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, defines itself
as “dedicated to restoring our government to citizens’
control . . . [t]hrough a combination of education, advocacy, and
grass roots organization.”57 It accepts donations from
individuals and from for-profit corporations.58 The suit, which
would later send shockwaves through the legal and political
communities, resulted from a film that Citizens United
produced and released in January 2008 entitled Hillary: The
Movie (Hillary),59 a ninety-minute documentary about thenSenator Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for President.60 As the
Court noted, “Hillary mention[ed] Senator Clinton by name
and depict[ed] interviews with political commentators and
other persons, most of them quite critical of Senator Clinton.”61
Citizens United released the film to theaters and put it out on
DVD, but the organization also wanted to arrange for
distribution via video-on-demand and run advertisements on
broadcast and cable television that included a statement about
Clinton, the name of the film, and the movie’s web address.62
Citizens United planned to have at least three of the
advertisements broadcasted within thirty days before the 2008
Democratic National Convention and within sixty days before
the 2008 general election, ostensibly in violation of the BCRA’s

56

WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 1-2; GARRETT, supra note 13, at 1-2.
About Citizens United, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/
who-we-are.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
58
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. Professor Hasen has noted that “[b]y
taking some for-profit corporate money, the corporation appeared ineligible for the
MCFL exemption.” Hasen, supra note 32, at 591 n.59; see also supra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text.
59
HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United Productions 2008).
60
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
61
Id. at 887. Professor Hasen has noted that the documentary “contain[ed] a
great many negative statements” about then-Senator Clinton. Hasen, supra note 32, at
591-92.
62
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (“Video-on-demand allows digital cable
subscribers to select programming from various menus, including movies, television
shows, sports, news, and music. The viewer can watch the program at any time and
can elect to rewind or pause the program.”). The Court noted that they found the
statements about then-Senator Clinton to be “pejorative.” Id. at 887.
57
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ban on electioneering communications within those time
periods.63
Before Citizens United, federal campaign-finance law
prohibited corporations and unions from funding independent
expenditures that expressly advocated for the election or defeat
of a candidate (express advocacy) as well as “‘any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refer[red] to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office’ and [was] made within
[thirty] days of a primary or [sixty] days of a general election”
(electioneering communication).64 As an alternative, federal
campaign-finance law allowed corporations to establish PACs,
which could in turn receive donations from shareholders or
employees of the corporation and make independent political
expenditures with those funds.65 If the FEC considered Hillary
and the advertisements to be either express advocacy,
electioneering communications, or both, then it could have
subjected Citizens United to civil and criminal penalties.66
Therefore, Citizens United brought suit to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief against the FEC regarding those provisions.
The complaint argued that the prohibition on express advocacy
and electioneering communications was unconstitutional as
applied to the film and its advertisements.67
B.

The Analysis and Holding

The Citizens United decision steeply veered away from
critical precedents. From the very beginning of the decision, the
Court justified its enormous step in overturning two major
decisions, Austin and McConnell, by framing the outcome of the
case as nearly unavoidable. In its rationalization, the Court

63

Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2008); see also
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. “[B]oth periods are within BCRA’s definition of an
electioneering communication.” Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 276. Citizens
United’s complaint “contain[ed] two major claims: (1) that [the] prohibition of corporate
disbursements for electioneering communications violates the First Amendment on its
face and as applied [in this case]; and (2) that [the statute] requiring disclosure
and . . . disclaimers are unconstitutional as applied” to Citizen United’s movie and
advertisements. Id. at 277 (footnotes omitted).
64
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(A) (2006));
see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
65
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887-88; see also supra Part I.
66
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; see also 2 U.S.C. § 437g.
67
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; Amended Verified Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-2240-RCL).

2011]

AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE

353

explained it could not decide the case on a narrower ground68—
either through statutory interpretation or a limited
constitutional holding.69 In particular, the Court took great pains
to explain the lack of opportunity for a ruling based on the more
limited as-applied challenge brought by Citizens United.70 For
example, the Court pointed out that because “the District Court
addressed the facial validity of the statute . . .[,] it [was] necessary
[for the Court] to consider . . . facial validity” as well.71 The Court
“decline[d] to adopt an interpretation that require[d] intricate
case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech is
banned[,]” because such a “course of decision would prolong the
substantial, nation-wide chilling effect caused by [section] 441b’s
prohibitions on corporate expenditures.”72 The Court’s conclusion
that it could not pursue narrower grounds and its use of
statements such as, “First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive,”73 indicated what would later become the
sweeping holding of the Court.74
68

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (“[W]e first address whether Citizens
United’s claim that § 441b cannot be applied to Hillary may be resolved on other,
narrower grounds.”); see also Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and
Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
643, 664 (2011) (“The Court [was] determined not to resolve Citizens United’s
complaint on any . . . narrower grounds . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction
About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 946 (2011) (“[T]he Court could have
held a challenged provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act invalid as
applied to the party before it, but instead opted to pronounce it invalid on its face.”);
Harold Anthony Lloyd, A Right but Wrong Place: Righting and Rewriting Citizens
United, 56 S.D. L. REV. 219, 220 (2011) (The Court “[d]eclin[ed] to decide the case on
narrower grounds and resurrect[ed] a facial challenge that Citizens United had
waived . . . .”).
69
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890 (“[T]here is no reasonable interpretation
of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton. Under the standard
stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the film qualifies as the
functional equivalent of express advocacy.”). The Court also noted that although “the
Court should construe statutes as necessary to avoid constitutional questions, the
series of steps suggested would be difficult to take in view of the language of the
statute.” Id. at 892.
70
Id. at 891-92. An as-applied challenge would only raise the question of
whether the relevant statute was constitutionally invalid in a specific situation.
However, a facial challenge is a general challenge to the statute itself. Commentators
have noted that this case ended the Roberts Court’s trend of a “resistance to
constitutional challenges seeking the facial invalidation of laws . . . .” Patricia Millett et
al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free Speech in the 2009 Term, 5
CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 14 (2010).
71
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893.
72
Id. at 892, 894.
73
Id. at 892 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468-69
(2007)).
74
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court could and should
have decided the case on far narrower grounds and that the majority overreached in its
decision. Id. at 931-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Next, the Court found it “necessary to consider Citizens
United’s challenge to Austin and the facial validity of [section]
441b’s expenditure ban.”75 As discussed above, section 441b
criminalizes express advocacy or electioneering communications
by a corporation.76 Although the Court acknowledged that PACs
provide some alternative for corporations seeking to take part in
public political discourse, the Court held that the existence of
this alternative was “burdensome,” “expensive to administer,”
“subject to extensive regulations,” and thus “[did] not alleviate
the First Amendment problems with [section] 441b.”77 In
addition, the Court determined that these practical concerns
about PACs rendered “[s]ection 441b’s prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures [as] . . . a ban on speech” whose
“purpose and effect [were] to silence entities whose voices the
Government deem[ed] to be suspect.”78
The Court analyzed section 441b as if it applied to
individuals, based on the premise that “political speech of
corporations or other associations should [not] be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because such
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”79 Therefore, the Court
considered whether a regulation like section 441b could be
applied to an individual and concluded that if Congress enacted
such a regulation, “no one would believe that it [was] merely a
time, place, or manner restriction on speech.”80 This vast

75

Id. at 893 (majority opinion). The Court noted that “[a]ny other course of
decision would prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by [section]
441b’s prohibitions on corporate expenditures.” Id. at 894.
76
Id. at 897 (“Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including
nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of
candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within [thirty] days of a
primary election and [sixty] days of a general election.” (emphasis added)).
77
Id. As part of their exploration of the practical concerns about the PAC
alternative to regular corporate political speech, the Court also found that “[g]iven the
onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make
its views known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.” Id. at 898.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978)).
80
Id. at 898. Generally, time, place, or manner restrictions on speech are
constitutional. The Court also noted that
[a]s a practical matter, however, given the complexity of the regulations and
the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who
wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending
against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior
permission to speak. These onerous restrictions thus function as the
equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing
laws implemented in [sixteenth] and [seventeenth] century England, laws
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disparity between speakers in the political realm doomed
section 441b’s chance of being upheld as constitutional. The
Court found that laws that restrict the speech of some
speakers, but not others, constitute an attempt to control the
content of the restricted speakers.81
In addition to analyzing the law’s actual and potential
effects, the Court assessed the interests the law served in order
to determine whether its goals justified the means it employed.
For these types of assessments, the Court employs various
levels of “scrutiny.” The level of scrutiny applied often plays a
crucial role in dictating the outcome of a First Amendment
challenge.82 In Citizens United, the Court stated that “[l]aws
that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’
which requires the Government to prove that the restriction
‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.’”83
Under the strict scrutiny analysis, only an interest that
the Supreme Court recognizes as compelling will justify some of
the most dubious legislation.84 A narrowly tailored law is one
that is not over- or underinclusive in serving the compelling
interest it purports to further. In Citizens United, the Court
spent most of its energy determining whether a compelling
interest existed rather than analyzing whether the law was
narrowly tailored.85 In order to serve a compelling interest in this

and governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn
to prohibit.
Id. at 895-96 (citations omitted).
81
Id. at 898-99 (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. As instruments to censor,
these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.” (citation omitted)).
82
See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV 1, 4 (2010)
(“The degree of deference often dictates the result in constitutional cases.”).
83
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). Generally, the Court employs a rational basis test that merely
requires that the regulation at issue is rationally related to an important governmental
interest. When the Court uses the rational basis test, it almost always upholds the law
in question. In contrast, strict scrutiny, the most rigorous test available to the Court
within existing First Amendment doctrine, almost always results in invalidation of the
law in question.
84
See Keirsten G. Anderson, Note, Protecting Unmarried Cohabitants from
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1017, 1023-24 (1997).
85
One commentator has noted that “[t]he Court did not deny that corporate
political speech does present [certain] problems but believed that the statutory ban was
both over- and under-inclusive . . . .” Melone, supra note 15, at 86. The Court’s focus on
whether the law served a compelling interest may indicate that the Court was less
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case, the Court suggested that the regulation would have to
restrict speech or expenditures that “interfere[d] with
governmental functions,” such as protecting a school or prison’s
ability to operate.86 The Court found that this regulation failed to
support a government function and actually undermined the
political process by preventing voters from “obtain[ing]
information from diverse sources,” including corporations, “in
order to determine how to cast their votes.”87 Therefore, the
Court concluded that there is “no basis for the proposition that,
in the context of political speech, the Government may impose
restrictions [such as section 441b] on certain disfavored
speakers,” such as corporations.88
Finally, the Court sought to provide clarity regarding its
decision to overrule Austin and partially overrule McConnell.
The Court based its departure from Austin and McConnell on
the ground that “[t]he ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond
all doubt protected makes it necessary in this case to invoke
the earlier precedents that a statute [that] chills speech can
and must be invalidated where its . . . invalidity has been
demonstrated.”89 Specifically, the Court held that the preAustin line of precedent, as exemplified by Bellotti, forbids any
restriction on political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.90 In addition, the Court found that the postAustin line of precedent would have erroneously permitted
such a restriction as justified by an interest in preventing
distortion of speech within the political process.91
As in previous cases, the Court focused on the
compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny
test rather than on the breadth prong. In Austin, the Court
identified the “compelling governmental interest” as
“preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
concerned with the scope of the solution and more concerned with the definition of the
problem that the solution sought to address.
86
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. The Court noted that it had “upheld a
narrow class of speech restrictions that operate[d] to the disadvantage of certain
persons, but th[o]se rulings were based on an interest in allowing government entities
to perform their functions.” Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
683 (1986); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974); Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
557 (1973)).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 896 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 482-83 (2007)).
90
Id. at 898-99 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
91
Id. at 903-04.
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the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’”92 The
Court did not take issue with the justification itself but instead
focused on the practical outcomes of accepting that justification
as a compelling governmental interest. For example, the Court
stressed that if “the antidistortion rationale were to be
accepted, . . . it would permit Government to ban political
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has
taken on the corporate form.”93 The Court cast aside the Austin
Court’s reliance on the antidistortion rationale as “an
aberration” and held that the true “purpose and effect of
[section 441b] is to prevent corporations, including small and
nonprofit corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions
to the public.”94 Therefore, the Court overruled Austin and part
of McConnell95 because section 441b was an “unlawful”96 and
“troubling assertion of brooding governmental power.”97
Instead, the Court chose to “return to the principle . . . that the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of
the speaker’s corporate identity.”98

92

Id. at 903 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,

660 (1990)).
93

Id. at 904. The Court also noted the Government’s argument “that Austin
permits [the Government] to ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of
communication stemming from a corporation.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court brought
the Government’s argument to what it viewed as its logical conclusion and found that “[i]f
Austin were correct, the Government could prohibit a corporation from expressing
political views in media beyond those presented here, such as by printing books.” Id. For
an extensive discussion of the antidistortion rationale, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens
United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2011).
94
Id. at 907. The Court also noted that under section 441b, “certain
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are
penalized for engaging in the same political speech” as wealthy individuals and
unincorporated associates, who could “spend unlimited amounts on independent
expenditures.” Id. at 908 (citation omitted).
95
Citizens United “overruled the portion of McConnell facially upholding the
electioneering-communication prohibition. As a result, the [Court’s] language about
government being able to prohibit ‘functional equivalent of express advocacy’ is gone.”
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 38, at 58 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913); see
also Wilson, supra note 9, at 2365 (Citizens United overruled “the portion of
[McConnell] that restricted independent corporate expenditures, as codified in section
203 of [BCRA]” (citations omitted)).
96
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
97
Id. at 904.
98
Id. at 913. The Court based this conclusion on its holding that “[n]o
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or
for-profit corporations.” Id.
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III.

MANDATORY SHAREHOLDER-APPROVAL PROPOSALS

After Citizens United, lawmakers,99 journalists,100 and
think tanks101 proposed several versions of a mandatory
shareholder-approval scheme in an attempt to rein in the new
political rights granted to corporations.102 Three of the most
prominent proposals include the End the Hijacking of
Shareholder Funds Act,103 the Shareholder Protection Act of
2010,104 and the Brennan Center for Justice’s proposal.105
Although the three proposals are similar, they have important
distinctions that may bear upon the constitutionality of their
limitations on corporate speech under the First Amendment.106
A.

End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act

On January 21, 2010, the same day the Court handed
down its decision in Citizens United, U.S. Representative Alan
Grayson responded by introducing the End the Hijacking of
Shareholder Funds Act (Shareholder Funds Act).107 At barely

99

See, e.g., End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th
Cong. § 2 (2010); Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010).
100
See, e.g., Alter, supra note 19 (“New laws regulating corporate governance
are also essential. Britain requires shareholders to vote on corporate political
expenditures. We should do the same . . . .”).
101
See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18,
at 1; Craig Holman, House Committee Passes Important Checks on Corporate Spending
on Elections, PUB. CITIZEN (July 29, 2010), http://citizenvox.org/2010/07/29/housecommittee-passes-important-checks-on-corporate-spending-on-elections/ (“Shareholders
should have a say on how their money is spent.”).
102
One commentator’s analysis of past corporate political spending “suggest[s]
that corporations and unions were major players on the political stage even before
Citizens United, and it is unclear how much the Court’s ruling is likely to change that
influence.” Gilpatrick, supra note 27, at 412.
103
End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. (2010).
104
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. (2010).
105
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23; TorresSpelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18. Since Professor TorresSpelliscy’s book chapter details the general proposal of the published report, this note
will consider both publications in tandem as one proposal.
106
This note will only discuss the shareholder approval proposals. It will not
discuss any proposed disclosure requirements because they are not relevant for the
purposes of the First Amendment analysis under Citizens United. In addition, it is of
interest that these proposals were put forth during a “trend toward shareholder
empowerment.” See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation?
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641,
655-58 (2011).
107
End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong.
(2010). Representative Grayson lost his bid for reelection on November 2, 2010. Elspeth
Reeve, What Will Crazy Alan Grayson Do Next?, ATLANTIC WIRE (Nov. 2, 2010, 10:58
PM), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2010/11/what-will-crazy-alan-grayson-do-
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two pages, the Shareholder Funds Act would, if enacted,
require that “[a]ny expenditure by a public company to
influence public opinion on matters not related to the
company’s products or services” have the approval of a
“majority of the votes cast by shareholders.”108 Expenditures
without this approval would “be considered a breach of a
fiduciary duty of the officers and directors who authorized such
an expenditure.”109 For such a breach, those officers and
directors would be personally liable to the company’s
shareholders for the amount of the expenditure.110 Although
seemingly simple and straightforward, the proposed bill is too
brief for Congress to take it seriously as a piece of legislation
that could be enacted in its current form. It has many
definitional issues and details that require resolution before
enactment could occur. For example, the bill defines only two
terms—“public company” and “shareholder.” A “public
company” is defined as “any issuer that is required to submit
periodical or other reports under section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. [§] 78m)” and “shareholder” is
defined as “any person who owns or holds a share of stock in a
public company.”111 In addition, the Shareholder Funds Act does
not define those matters that “influence public opinion” or
those matters that do—or do not—“relate[] to the company’s
products or services.”112 These definitional deficiencies raise
many questions. Are institutional shareholders, such as mutual
or pension funds, given votes under the definition? Do
shareholders have just one vote, or one vote for each share of
stock they own? Despite its incompleteness, the bill is
important because it likely provided the basis for the
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010,113 later proposed by U.S.
Representative Michael Capuano.

next/22443/. It remains to be seen whether this proposed legislation will survive
despite his absence from Congress.
108
End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
109
Id.
110
Id. (stating that officers and directors would be jointly and severally liable).
111
Id. § 3.
112
Id. § 2. Not only would these definitional issues be difficult for a
corporation, an attorney, or a court to interpret, but they may very well render this bill
unconstitutionally vague, even without reference to the inevitable First Amendment
strict scrutiny analysis that it would have to survive.
113
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. (2010).
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Shareholder Protection Act

Introduced six days after Citizens United was decided,
H.R. 4537, or the Shareholder Protection Act of 2010
(Shareholder Protection Act),114 is just over eight pages long—
four times as long as the Shareholder Funds Act. The
Shareholder Protection Act would amend section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to require any issuer
of securities115 to obtain “written affirmative authorization”
from a majority of its shareholders before spending more than
$10,000 in a given fiscal year on political expenditures.116 Like
the Shareholder Funds Act, the Shareholder Protection Act
would consider a violation of the prior-approval requirement as
a “breach of fiduciary duty of the officers and directors who
authorized” the political expenditure, and those officers and
directors would be “jointly and severally liable . . . for the
amount of such expenditure.”117 The bill defines political
expenditures very broadly—beyond the types of activities that
section 441b covered before Citizens United. In addition to
covering corporate independent political expenditures targeted
by section 441b, this proposal would also cover expenditures for
voter registration campaigns and trade association dues.118
114

Id.
“Issuer” is defined by the federal securities laws as “any person who issues
or proposes to issue any security [or] . . . the person or persons performing the acts and
assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of [a] trust or
other agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued . . . .” Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2006). A “person” is defined
broadly in federal securities law as “a natural person, company, government, or
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.” Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9); 2 U.S.C. § 434 (f) (2006).
116
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2010).
The bill defines “affirmative authorization” as “the full, free, and written consent of a
shareholder, obtained without intimidation or fear of reprisal, and shall not include
votes made by a broker or any other representative.” Id. By not including brokers or
representatives, it is unclear whether the bill would allow for institutional investors,
mutual funds, or hedge funds to vote either for or against approval of political
expenditures. The bill defines “majority of all shareholders” as the “number of
shareholders that combined own more than 50 percent of all outstanding shares.
Shareholders not casting votes shall not count toward such a majority.” Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. The bill defines “expenditure for political activities” as
115

(i) expenditures in support of, or opposition to, any Federal, State, or local
candidate; (ii) contributions to or expenditures in support of any political
party, committee, electioneering communication, voter registration campaign,
ballot measure campaign, or an issue advocacy campaign; and (iii) dues or
other payments to trade associations or other tax exempt organizations that
are, or could reasonably be anticipated to be, used for the purposes described
in subparagraphs [(i) and (ii)].
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In recognition of the special treatment by the Court of
media corporations in Bellotti and Citizens United,119 the
Shareholder Protection Act includes an exception for issuers
“whose sole business is the publication or broadcasting of news,
commentary, literature, music, entertainment, artistic
expression, scientific, historical or academic works, or other
forms of information.”120 The bill would require the Securities
and Exchange Commission to issue “guidance as it determines
necessary or appropriate regarding the extent of the
exemption.”121 Although more detailed than the Shareholder
Funds Act, the Shareholder Protection Act would actually cover
a broader group of corporations. While the Shareholder Funds
Act would only cover public companies,122 the Shareholder
Protection Act would cover all issuers of securities, including
some private corporations and many small businesses.123
C.

Brennan Center for Justice Proposal

On the same day that Representative Capuano
introduced the Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, the
Brennan Center for Justice published a proposal (Brennan
Center
Proposal)
that
would
“require
shareholder
authorization of future corporate political spending.”124 The
Brennan Center Proposal has the same two essential elements
as the Shareholder Funds Act and the Shareholder Protection
Act; it would require “corporations [to] obtain the consent of
shareholders before making political expenditures” and it
would “hold corporate directors personally liable for violations
of these policies.”125 In addition, the Brennan Center Proposal
Id. Section 441b banned corporations from using treasury funds for independent
expenditures and electioneering communications in close proximity to elections. 2
U.S.C. § 441b.
119
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978); Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905-06 (2010).
120
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010).
121
Id. This provision has the potential to bring the Securities and Exchange
Commission into conflict with the FEC, which is tasked with providing guidance on
federal campaign-finance law.
122
End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
123
H.R. 4537 § 3. However, the bill would carve out some limited exceptions.
See id. § 3(d).
124
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 4.
125
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21. This
proposal would not hold corporate officers liable, as would be the case under the
Shareholder Funds Act or the Shareholder Protection Act. See Torres-Spelliscy,
Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 74) (proposing that “[i]f a
corporation makes an unauthorized contribution or expenditure for a political activity,
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includes disclosure requirements that are undoubtedly
constitutional126 and helpful to shareholders that would
facilitate the BCRA’s central goal of a transparent democracy.127
Like the proposed bills’ provisions, these requirements would
amend federal securities law.128
The Brennan Center Proposal would require an “annual
shareholder vote to authorize any spending of $10,000 or more”
by a corporation for any political activity, but the corporation
may also request authorization more frequently.129 The proposal
defines “political activity” as “any contributions or expenditures
made directly or indirectly to, or in support of or opposition to,
any candidate, political party, committee, electioneering
communication, ballot measure campaign, or . . . issue
advocacy campaign.”130 For shareholder approval, the
corporation’s proposed political spending must receive a
majority vote from the corporation’s shareholders, defined

then the directors at the time that the unauthorized contribution or expenditure was
incurred are jointly and severally liable to repay to the corporation the amount of the
unauthorized expenditure, with interest at the rate of eight percent per annum”
(emphasis added)).
126
For example, the Brennan Center Proposal urges Congress to require
disclosure of political spending . . . frequent enough to notify shareholders
and the investing public of corporate spending habits, and yet with enough of
a time lag between reports so that corporations are not unduly burdened. To
accommodate these two competing goals, disclosure of political expenditures
should occur quarterly to coincide with company’s filing of its Form 10-Qs
with SEC. Because the political disclosure will be contemporaneous with the
10-Q filing, transaction costs can be minimized.
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21; see also Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirements); WHITAKER,
supra note 13, at 5. For a discussion supporting increased disclosure requirements, see
Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After
Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1061-64 (2011). However, one commentator has
argued that many disclosure regimes, including the DISCLOSE Act, may not be
constitutional under Citizens United due to the Court’s concern about the complexity of
campaign finance regulation. See Briffault, supra note 68, at 645-46, 668-70.
127
As the author of the Brennan Center Proposal has stated, “disclosure of
past political expenditures empowers the shareholder to anticipate whether future
political spending is likely to conform with his or her political views.” Torres-Spelliscy,
Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 66); see also WHITAKER,
supra note 13, at 7.
128
This portion of the proposal would amend section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note
23, (manuscript at 73).
129
Id. This proposal would cover “[a]ny corporation where proxies are solicited
in respect of any security registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act occurring on
or after the date . . . on which final rules are issued . . . .” Id.
130
Id. at 72. This proposal expressly excludes “activities defined as lobbying
under any local, state or federal law.” Id.
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explicitly to include institutional investors.131 In addition, the
Brennan Center Proposal includes a provision that would
require institutional investment managers to publicly disclose
how they voted on such political spending authorizations.132 By
contrast, neither of the proposed bills addresses institutional
investment managers—such as the managers of mutual,
pension, or hedge funds—that often play crucial roles in
securing shareholder majorities.133

IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY
SHAREHOLDER-APPROVAL PROPOSALS

After these proposals were put forth, the Congressional
Research Service134 raised the question of whether lawmakers
could draft a mandatory shareholder-approval law in a way
that would not “violat[e] the corporation’s free speech rights as
described by Citizens United.”135 In order to pass constitutional
muster and comply with Citizens United, the law or regulation
must not infringe upon the corporation’s right to free speech as
guaranteed by the First Amendment.136

131

Id. at 74. “Majority of all shareholders” is defined as “a vote of
shareholders that combined own 50 percent plus one of all outstanding shares.
Shareholders not casting votes shall not count toward affirmative authorization under
this [proposal].” Id. at 72.
132
Id. at 74 (proposing that “[e]very institutional investment manager subject
to section 13(f) of the Exchange Act shall report at least annually how it voted on any
shareholder vote . . . unless such vote is otherwise required to be reported publicly by
rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission.”).
133
As of 2002, 58 percent of U.S. equities were owned by institutional
investors, a percentage that has risen nearly every year. Murat Binay, Performance
Attribution of US Institutional Investors, FIN. MGMT., Summer 2005, at 127, 128. For
further discussion of institutional shareholders in light of Citizens United, see Melone,
supra note 15, at 85; Osterlind, supra note 16, at 281.
134
Congressional Research Service, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/ (“The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works
exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to
committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation.
As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued
and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.”).
135
WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 8; see also GARRETT, supra note 13, at 6 (stating
that this proposal “could raise questions about whether the requirements were essentially
stifling corporate political speech”). The Congressional Research Service also notes that
“[t]he practicalities of . . . enforcement of this kind of legislation may need to be carefully
considered in order not to run afoul of corporate freedom of speech rights defined by the
Supreme Court in Citizens United.” WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 8.
136
Although the “Constitution’s Commerce Clause may arguably provide
Congress with authority to enact legislation of the type in question,” the First
Amendment must also be satisfied. WHITAKER, supra note 13, at 7 (citing U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”137 All three proposals would create
significant barriers, constitutional or not, to corporate political
speech on multiple levels. When a law has the potential to
burden political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.138 To
survive this test, the government must show that the
regulation advances a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to further that interest.139 Therefore, the
proposals must meet this exacting standard to pass muster.140
In order to overcome this burden, three interests have been set
forth to justify the proposals—anticorruption, anticorrosion,
and shareholder protection.
A.

Anticorruption

The restrictions on speech embodied in the three proposals
must advance a compelling governmental interest in order to
survive strict scrutiny. The first potential compelling
governmental interest is anticorruption. In Austin, Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, found that independent
expenditures had the potential to cause “real or apparent
corruption.”141 Although the Austin Court acknowledged that
direct contributions more naturally raised a concern about
“‘financial quid pro quo’”142 than independent expenditures, it
recognized that the prevention of this type of corruption provided
a “‘compelling governmental interest . . . [for] the restriction of the
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate
form.’”143 Accordingly, the Austin Court held that corporations had
no constitutional right to make independent campaign
expenditures out of their general treasuries.144

137

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
139
Id.
140
In addition to a constitutional law analysis, corporate law considerations
must be considered when evaluating the proposals discussed in this note. For
arguments against the proposals on corporate law grounds, see Stephen A. Yoder,
Legislative Intervention in Corporate Governance Is Not a Necessary Response to
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 29 J.L. & COM. 1, 15-21 (2010).
141
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (citing
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978)).
142
Id. (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 497 (1985)) (emphasis omitted).
143
Id. (quoting Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 500-01).
144
Id. at 655.
138
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In McConnell, Justices Stevens and O’Connor, writing
for the majority, expanded the breadth of anticorruption as a
compelling governmental interest. The McConnell Court stated
that Congress had a legitimate interest in stopping corruption,
or the appearance thereof, well beyond eliminating mere “cashfor-votes” schemes.145 The Court held that this rationale
extended
to
preventing
“‘improper
influence’”
and
“‘opportunities for abuse,’” including those that arose from
elected officials who were “‘too compliant with the wishes of
large contributors.’”146 In their decision, Justices Stevens and
O’Connor also dug deeper than the Austin Court to uncover
what they essentially cast as the “real world” of political
campaign financing. For example, they quoted many former
lobbyists and members of Congress when they discussed the highlevel influence and access gained through large independent
corporate expenditures.147 The majority’s emphasis on the
practical effect of the campaign-financing scheme reflected the
Court’s concern with current political realities rather than with
the theoretical implications of such regulations.
Unlike the majority opinions of the Austin and
McConnell Courts, the anticorruption rationale as a compelling
governmental interest found popularity only with the dissent
in Citizens United. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, argued
that the Citizens United Court construed the anticorruption
interest too narrowly and that it actually encompasses more
than just quid pro quo corruption.148 Rather, he argued that the
compelling governmental interest also included the prevention
of independent expenditures from having an “undue influence
on an office holder’s judgment” or from generating an
“appearance of such influence.”149
145

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003).
Id. at 143 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389
(2000)). One commentator has noted that “Justice Kennedy distinguished corruption
from ‘favoritism and influence,’ which were ‘not . . . avoidable in representative
politics.’” Eliza P. Nagel, Note, For the People or Despite the People: The Threat of
Corporations’ Growing Power Through Citizens United and the Demise of the Honest
Services Law, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 760 (2011) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010))
147
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150-52.
148
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 961 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Stevens elaborated that
146

[c]orruption can take many forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the
difference between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not
kind. And selling access is not qualitatively different from giving special
preference to those who spent money on one’s behalf. Corruption operates
along a spectrum, and the majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo
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Justice Kennedy’s view of the anticorruption rationale
was far narrower in Citizens United.150 As expressed in the
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy defined the anticorruption
rationale as only applying to quid pro quo corruption—
essentially only bribery—and not as encompassing the broader
definition that Justice Stevens advocated.151 In addition, Justice
Kennedy articulated what appeared to be a different conception
of democracy than that held by Justice Stevens. Rather than
viewing politicians’ reactions to corporate expenditures as a
sign of corruption, Justice Kennedy viewed the give-and-take
between politicians and corporations as the relationship that
should exist between representatives and their constituents.152
Instead of perceiving responsiveness to corporate interests as
corruption, Justice Kennedy found such responsiveness to be of
a democratic nature—which should be enjoyed by all
constituents.153 Most importantly, the Citizens United Court,
through Justice Kennedy, concluded that independent
expenditures by corporations, by their nature, “do not give rise
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”154
There is a plausible argument that mandatory
shareholder approval would further the anticorruption interest,
as broadly defined by Justice Stevens in his dissent. The
premise of the proposals is that they will likely reduce the
amount of money that corporations, in the aggregate, spend on
political causes. However, no plausible argument exists that

arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does
not accord with the theory or reality of politics.
Id.
150

For a critical view of Justice Kennedy’s definition of corruption in Citizens
United, see Andrew T. Newcomer, Comment, The “Crabbed View of Corruption”: How
the U.S. Supreme Court Has Given Corporations the Green Light to Gain Influence over
Politicians by Spending on Their Behalf, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 267-71 (2010).
151
See Kang, supra note 9, at 250 (“Justice Kennedy’s view of corruption may
limit campaign finance restrictions to not much beyond the regulation of contributions
to candidates and officeholders.”); Peterman, supra note 12, at 1175-78.
152
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (“The fact that speakers
may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials
are corrupt.”).
153
Id. (“It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support
those policies . . . . Democracy is founded on responsiveness.” (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part))).
154
Id. at 909. “By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech
presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact that a
corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.” Id. at
910 (citation omitted).
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these proposals would further the narrower definition of
anticorruption stated in Citizens United by Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion. The inferential connection between
shareholder approval of independent political expenditures and
the prevention of quid pro quo corruption is tenuous. As the
Citizens United Court expressly stated, the independent
character of the expenditures makes them—by the expenditures’
very nature—incapable of creating a quid pro quo relationship,
because, by definition, it is unlawful for those who make
independent expenditures to coordinate with a candidate for
federal office.155 Therefore, the anticorruption rationale cannot
serve as a compelling governmental interest for the mandatory
shareholder-approval proposals.
B.

Anticorrosion

The second potentially compelling governmental
interest is anticorrosion. In Austin, Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, found that in addition to the government’s
interest in preventing real or apparent corruption, the
government had a compelling interest in preventing
corporations from unfairly influencing elections through
independent expenditures.156 The Austin Court differentiated
between independent expenditures by individuals and those by
corporations on the ground that corporations benefited from
“the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates
the amassing of large treasuries.”157 Based on this finding, the
Court held that corporations’ “immense aggregations of wealth”
had the potential to be “corrosive” in the political arena
because the independent expenditures funded by that wealth
“have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.”158
Justice Scalia rejected the Court’s categorization of
anticorrosion as a compelling governmental interest in a
dissenting opinion in Austin. Instead, Justice Scalia called
corrosion the “New Corruption” and argued that the attempt to
fight so-called corrosion was actually an effort by the Court to
155

Id. at 909-11.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
157
Id.
158
Id. The Court further stated that the legislation in question “does not
attempt to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections, rather, it ensures
that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by
corporations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
156

368

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

mandate that “[e]xpenditures must reflect actual public support
for the political ideas espoused.”159 The Court could use this type
of equalization rationale, Justice Scalia argued, to restrict
“virtually anything [it] deems politically undesirable.”160 Relying
on the Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo161 that independent
expenditures raise little risk of corruption, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Court’s reasoning cannot be reconciled
“unless one thinks it would be lawful to prohibit men and
women whose net worth is above a certain figure from endorsing
political candidates.”162
In Citizens United, the Court rejected Austin’s
anticorrosion interest on the basis that it was essentially an
interest in equalizing speech.163 Echoing Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Austin, the Court noted that any interest in equalizing speech
in the political realm had been rejected as early as Buckley.164
Chief Justice Roberts, writing in concurrence, argued that
Austin’s reasoning was in conflict “with Buckley’s explicit
repudiation of any government interest in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections.”165 The Court restored the clear distinction
between independent expenditures and contributions with the
potential for corruption or corrosion and noted that independent
expenditures simply create little or no risk of either problem.
In the context of the mandatory shareholder-approval
proposals, a plausible argument exists that the proposals will
serve the anticorrosion interest, as explained by Justice Marshall
in Austin. The premise of the proposals is that they will likely
reduce the amount of money that corporations, in the aggregate,
spend on political causes. After Citizens United, however, there is
little possibility that the Court will recognize an anticorrosion
interest, much less one that would justify restrictions on
independent expenditures. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
159

Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id.
161
424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley involved a constitutional challenge to the
Federal Election Campaign Act by various candidates for federal office, political
parties, and organizations. The Court upheld provisions limiting individual
contributions to campaigns but invalidated provisions that limited the amount a
candidate could spend on his own election and the total expenditures for particular
campaigns. Id. at 58-59.
162
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
163
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903-04 (2010).
164
Id. at 904.
165
Id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
160
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majority, made it clear that the Court has found the anticorrosion
interest as the equivalent of speech equalization, and Buckley
strongly prohibits speech equalization as a compelling
government interest.166 Therefore, the anticorrosion rationale
cannot serve as a compelling governmental interest for the
mandatory shareholder-approval proposals.
C.

Shareholder Protection

In the wake of Citizens United, it is unlikely that the
Court will uphold a mandatory shareholder-approval law, or
any restriction on corporate independent expenditures, on the
basis of the anticorruption or anticorrosion rationales.167 The
Citizens United Court construed the anticorruption rationale
narrowly and dismissed the anticorrosion rationale entirely.
Because neither of these interests has the potential to function
as the compelling governmental interest needed to justify the
mandatory shareholder-approval proposals, another potential
interest must exist for the proposals to pass constitutional
muster. Those in favor of limits on corporate expenditures, the
supporters of the BCRA and lamenters of Citizens United, have
now focused their attention on the one rationale left standing
after Citizens United: the shareholder-protection interest.168
The mandatory shareholder-approval proposals are
based on the premise that shareholders need new regulations
to protect them in light of the rights afforded to corporations
under Citizens United. In particular, the concern is that
publicly traded companies will spend money invested by
shareholders in a way that may overlook the interests of the
shareholders and instead support the managers’ personal

166

Id. at 904 (majority opinion).
See Kang, supra note 9, at 245 (noting “the fact that a government
restriction makes shareholder speech more difficult is obviously insufficient by itself to
justify a constitutional prohibition of that restriction”).
168
See Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23,
(manuscript at 69). However, one commentator has argued that in the Citizen United
Court’s “majority opinion, Justice Kennedy reject[ed] the shareholder protection
interest as a reason for restricting corporate speech” and “that corporate democracy
mechanisms should be even more effective today than they would have been at the
time the [BCRA] was passed . . . .” Yoder, supra note 140, at 11. For a policy-based
criticism of the shareholder-protection rationale, see David G. Yosifon, The Public
Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens
United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1228-30 (2011).
167

370

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

political agendas or otherwise damage the corporation.169 The
proponents of mandating shareholder approval of such
expenditures hope to curb “unfettered corporate political
spending” and eliminate the risk of corporate “managers’
potentially profligate spending on politics.”170
The Court first identified shareholder protection as a
governmental interest in Bellotti,171 the same case that
recognized the political speech rights of corporations.172 In
Bellotti, the Court struck down a state statute that banned
corporate political expenditures on referenda unrelated to that
corporation’s proprietary interests.173 Similar to the method for
examining a statute for narrow tailoring, the Bellotti Court’s
“fit” analysis essentially saw the potential for shareholder
democracy as a less burdensome alternative to regulation and
assessed whether the statute was over- or underinclusive.174
Because the Court based its holding on the statute’s failure
under the “fit” analysis, the Court did not reach the issue of
whether shareholder protection can serve as a compelling
governmental interest.175
The shareholder-protection issue was also raised but not
addressed conclusively in MCFL.176 Unlike the for-profit
corporation and referendum-campaign context in Bellotti, the
MCFL Court had to resolve a First Amendment challenge in a
situation that involved a nonprofit corporation and an election
for political office.177 Because the entity at issue was a nonprofit
corporation, which by nature does not have shareholders, no
potential existed for board members to spend shareholder
169

Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 9-10; see
also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90-94 (2010).
170
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 8-9.
However, “[s]imply making independent speakers jump through more regulatory hoops
may not create any curbing effect in the real world . . . .” Note, Restoring Electoral
Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1528, 1546 (2011). Furthermore, one commentator has argued that “reformers who
insist on limiting the political arena of corporate speech greatly exaggerate the effect
that such speech has on political outcomes.” Melone, supra note 15, at 94; see also
Bingham, supra note 126, at 1047 (“[I]t is questionable whether the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC will alter the way corporations spend
money on federal elections at all.”).
171
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792, 795 (1978) (The
protection of “corporate shareholders [is] an interest that is . . . legitimate.”).
172
Id. at 780.
173
Id. at 791-92; see also Lambert, supra note 29, at 21.
174
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793-94.
175
Id. at 795.
176
479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986).
177
Id. at 241-42.
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investments on political expenditures without their consent.178
Instead, the members of MCFL joined the organization because
they agreed with its political or ideological purpose.179 On that
basis, the Court held that ideological nonprofits that do not
take corporate or union donations could not be banned from
spending their treasury funds on explicit political advocacy.180
The Austin Court built on the shareholder-protection
rationale discussed in Bellotti and MCFL and held that
corporations had no constitutional right to make independent
campaign expenditures out of their general treasuries,181
although they could support issue advocacy that mentioned
specific candidates.182 In upholding a state law that banned
nonmedia corporations from using corporate funds from their
general treasuries to make independent expenditures on behalf
of, or against, state electoral candidates,183 the Court found that
the shareholders’ ability to withdraw from corporate
association as a result of political expenditures would not
sufficiently protect them.184 Thus, the Austin Court concluded
there was a compelling governmental interest in “preventing a
corporation . . . from exploiting those who do not wish to
contribute to [its] political message.”185
178

Id. at 241 (“MCFL was incorporated . . . as a nonprofit, nonstock
corporation under Massachusetts law.”).
179
Id. at 242. MCFL’s “resources come from voluntary donations from
‘members,’ and from various fundraising activities such as garage sales, bake sales,
dances, raffles, and picnics. The corporation considers its ‘members’ those persons who
have either contributed to the organization in the past or indicated support for its
activities.” Id. (footnote omitted).
180
Id. at 262-64. The shareholder-protection interest was not a basis for the
decision because, as a nonprofit corporation, MCFL had “members,” not “shareholders.”
181
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
182
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 38, at 32.
183
Austin, 494 U.S. at 654.
184
See id. at 663. The Court did point out that similar to MCFL,
the Chamber also lacks shareholders, [but] many of its members may
be . . . reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the
Chamber’s political expression, because they wish to benefit from the
Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with other
members of the business community. The Chamber’s political agenda is
sufficiently distinct from its educational and outreach programs that
members who disagree with the former may continue to pay dues to
participate in the latter . . . . Thus, we are persuaded that the Chamber’s
members are more similar to shareholders of a business corporation than to
the members of MCFL.
Id. (footnote omitted).
185
Id. at 675. On a practical level, the Court voiced concern that “shareholders
in a large business corporation may find it prohibitively expensive to monitor the
activities of the corporation to determine whether it is making expenditures to which
they object.” Id. at 674 n.5.
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In Citizens United, the Court returned to essentially the
same shareholder-protection analysis set forth in Bellotti—a
three-part “fit” inquiry that examined (1) whether corporate
democracy can adequately protect shareholders, (2) whether the
statute purportedly protecting shareholders is overinclusive, and
(3) whether the statute purportedly protecting shareholders is
underinclusive.186 If corporate democracy, as a less restrictive
means, can adequately protect shareholders or if the statute is
either over- or underinclusive, then the statute is constitutionally
invalid. The Citizens United Court found that the relevant portion
of the BCRA failed on all three parts of the inquiry because
voluntary corporate democracy protected shareholders’ interests
adequately in this situation, and the statute was both over- and
underinclusive.187 The Court found the BCRA overinclusive in its
coverage of all corporations—including those with merely one
shareholder—and underinclusive in its ban on electioneering
communications taking effect only during specific time periods.188
In overruling Austin, the Citizens United Court also cast
aside the Austin Court’s formulation of shareholder protection as
a compelling governmental interest.189 Justice Kennedy stated
that the current structure of corporate democracy is able to
adequately protect shareholders’ interests.190 The Court did not
suggest that legislation was needed to strengthen or mandate
those procedures, nor did it suggest that the voluntary nature of
corporate democracy created an independent issue.191
The Shareholder Funds Act, the Shareholder Protection
Act, and the Brennan Center Proposal are all aimed ostensibly
at the protection of shareholders. Beyond the suggestion in
Citizens United that the current structure of corporate
democracy can serve to protect this interest without further
legislation, the next barrier that the proposals must overcome
is whether they are narrowly tailored to the interest of
186

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
187
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
188
Id.
189
Id.; see also John C. Coates, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political
Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? 16 (Harvard L.
& Econ., Discussion Paper No. 684, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1680861 (“In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of
corporations to spend money on elections, and in so doing, the Court rejected a
shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions on spending.”).
190
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (“There is . . . little evidence of abuse
that cannot be corrected by shareholders through the procedures of corporate
democracy.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
191
See id.
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shareholder protection.192 In order to reach this analysis, this
note assumes for the sake of argument that the Court could
find shareholder protection to be a compelling governmental
interest for this type of legislation.
1. End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act
The Shareholder Funds Act will likely fail a “narrowly
tailored” analysis because it contains three aspects that render
it overinclusive. First, the Act covers a far broader scope of
political spending than just independent political expenditures,
which is the narrow class of speech that Citizens United
suggested that shareholders may have an interest in voluntarily
restricting.193 Instead, this bill would sweepingly cover all
expenditures to influence public opinion in a way that only
indirectly relates to that corporation’s products or services.194
This overbreadth has the potential to restrict speech well beyond
the political realm and include environmentally supportive
speech and many general goodwill advertising campaigns that
do not actually “relate” to products or services.195 There is little
basis to suggest that the government can restrict these types of
speech properly under the First Amendment.196

192

Some commentators have argued that rather than creating a new burden
for corporate political speech, the mandatory shareholder approval proposals simply
legislate the “corporate democracy” that Justice Kennedy referenced in his opinion. See
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 160, at 90-94. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion put
strong emphasis on using the least restrictive means possible to ameliorate any issues
that could potentially provide a compelling governmental interest. See Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 911. Justice Kennedy clearly stated that shareholder protection could not
justify the BCRA regulations at issue in Citizens United because of the options already
available through corporate democracy. See id. Rather than “enhance” or “enable”
corporate democracy, the mandatory voting proposals would likely be viewed as an
additional, and unconstitutional, burden by the Court.
193
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
194
End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2
(2010) (“Any expenditure by a public company to influence public opinion on matters
not related to the company’s products or services that has not been approved by a
majority of the votes cast by shareholders to approve or disapprove such expenditure
shall be considered a breach of a fiduciary duty of the officers and directors who
authorized such an expenditure.”).
195
Corporations often run general “Happy Holidays” or other types of
advertisements that are “not related” to their products or services. For example, Kmart
paid for an advertisement in the New York Times shortly after September 11, 2001 that
was simply a full-page American flag. See N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 24.
196
But see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Second, the Act would cover media corporations because
it provides no exemption for such entities.197 The Citizens
United Court cautioned that any bill that hinders the ability of
a media corporation to engage in political speech will almost
certainly fail the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.198 This
proposal runs afoul of that principle by defining “public
company” in a manner that would encompass any media
organization that is owned by a publicly traded corporation.199
Third, the Act would likely cover some independent
expenditures made for the purpose of lobbying.200 The Citizens
United Court stated that although mandating disclosure of
lobbying expenditures is constitutional, the Constitution does
not tolerate other restrictions on lobbying.201 Many corporations
have in-house employees, consultants, and lawyers that lobby
federal, state, and local governments on a range of regulatory and
appropriations-related issues. In addition, corporations often
contribute funds to trade associations, such as the Recording
Industry Association of America or the Pharmaceutical Research
Manufacturers of America, in order to support lobbying efforts on
behalf of their industry. The Court would likely find a barrier of
mandatory shareholder approval between a corporation and
policymakers or regulators impermissible.
Therefore, the Act is overinclusive in that it encompasses
media corporations and covers vastly more speech than
independent political expenditures, including goodwill
advertising campaigns and lobbying activities. Due to this
overinclusiveness, the Shareholder Funds Act fails the “fit”
analysis set forth in Citizens United and is not “narrowly
tailored” to the shareholder-protection interest.

197

See Jones, supra note 2, at 305-08. For a discussion of the media/non-media
corporation divide in campaign finance jurisprudence, see Joel M. Gora, The First
Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 955-57 (2011).
198
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906 (“There is simply no support for the
view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the
suppression of political speech by media corporations.”).
199
See id. For example, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and all
major American television news networks are owned by publicly traded corporations.
The bill defines a “public company” as “any issuer that is required to submit periodical
or other reports under section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m).” H.R. 4487 § 3(1).
200
It is likely that courts would interpret the bill to cover some lobbying
expenses since support of a tax-related bill, immigration reform, or healthcare legislation
would presumably be “not related to the company’s products or services.” H.R. 4487 § 2.
201
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
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2. Shareholder Protection Act
Similar to the Shareholder Funds Act, the Shareholder
Protection Act will likely fail the “narrowly tailored” analysis,
because it contains two aspects that render it overinclusive.202
First, the exemption for media corporations is extremely
narrow.203 While the New York Times Company’s “sole
business” is the publication of news (and so it would be
exempted from the Act), the companies that own and operate
ABC News or The Colbert Report, for example, would not be
exempted, because they operate businesses that are not dedicated
to publication of news or related purposes.204 Therefore, the
Shareholder Protection Act would impermissibly subject many
significant media outlets in the United States to rigorous
shareholder-approval procedures. As noted above, the Citizens
United Court made it clear that even the potential for regulation
of political speech or expenditures of media corporations would
almost certainly fail the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.205
Second, the Shareholder Protection Act is overinclusive
because it would apply not only to independent expenditures in
federal elections, but also to independent expenditures made
with regard to state or local elections.206 This broad and explicit
application reaches far beyond the expenditures that the BCRA
sought to restrict and raises serious federalism concerns.207 The
Court, under Citizens United or other Supreme Court
precedent, would likely invalidate this provision because it
exceeds the power granted to Congress.208 The BCRA did not
venture to regulate corporate expenditures made with regard
202

See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1041-45 (2011).
203
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2010).
204
The New York Times Company is the owner of the New York Times and
several other newspapers. ABC News is owned by The Walt Disney Company and The
Colbert Report is aired on Comedy Central, which is owned by Viacom. The Walt
Disney Company and Viacom both have divisions or subsidiaries that would not be
considered publishers or broadcasters of “news, commentary, literature, music,
entertainment, artistic expression, scientific, historical or academic works, or other
forms of information.” Id. For example, The Walt Disney Company owns and operates
theme parks and Viacom owns video-gaming websites. Neither of these examples
constitutes publishing or broadcasting of any kind.
205
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906; see also supra Part IV.C.1.
206
H.R. 4537 § 3(e)(4)(A)(i).
207
But see Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23,
(manuscript at 66-69).
208
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (holding that the power to
regulate state elections is vested in the states, not Congress, pursuant to the Elections
Clause); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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to state or local elections, and the broad sweep of this proposal
crosses the line between what Congress can and cannot
regulate.209
Therefore, the Shareholder Protection Act is
overinclusive because it would not exempt many media
corporations and would unprecedentedly expand federal
campaign-finance law to regulate corporate expenditures in
state and local elections. As a result of this overinclusiveness,
the Shareholder Protection Act fails the “fit” analysis set forth
in Citizens United, and the Court will likely find it not
“narrowly tailored” to the shareholder-protection interest.
3. Brennan Center for Justice Proposal
The Brennan Center Proposal has the same core element
as the Shareholder Funds Act and the Shareholder Protection
Act—it would require “corporations [to] obtain the consent of
shareholders before making political expenditures.”210 The
proposal defines “political activity” as “any contributions or
expenditures made directly or indirectly to, or in support of or
opposition to, any candidate, political party, committee,
electioneering communication, ballot measure campaign, or an
issue advocacy campaign.”211 While the Brennan Center Proposal
does exempt expenditures on lobbying from coverage, it makes no
exception for media corporations.212 Although it is the best crafted
of the three proposals, the Brennan Center Proposal is still likely
to fail the “narrowly tailored” analysis because it contains
elements that render it both over- and underinclusive.
Two aspects of the Brennan Center Proposal are
overinclusive. First, the proposal would apply equally to publicly
owned nonmedia and media corporations alike.213 In Citizens
United, the Court found that even the mere possibility of
restricting media corporations would ensure constitutional
209

BCRA prohibited corporations from expending general treasury funds for
“electioneering communications,” which were defined as broadcast advertisements that
“refer to” a federal candidate for a period of time directly before a primary or general
election. L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB98025, CAMPAIGN FINANCE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOFT MONEY 1 (2003), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28106.pdf. It is likely that it is beyond the
enumerated powers granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution to regulate campaign
financing with regard to state or local elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
210
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 21.
211
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23, (manuscript at 72).
212
See id.
213
See id. at 71-77.
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invalidation of any campaign-finance legislation.214 The proposal
does not attempt to exempt media corporations nor does it
address this point of overinclusiveness as a known shortcoming.
This aspect of the proposal casts too wide a net and would
encompass every major media corporation in a way that the
Court likely will find impermissible under the First
Amendment.
Second, the Brennan Center Proposal would restrict a
corporation’s ability to conduct an “issue advocacy campaign”
which, as defined, is overly broad because it could potentially
include activity from which shareholders need no protection.215 The
proposal would define “issue advocacy campaign” as “contributions
or expenditures for any communication to the general public
intended to encourage the public to contact a government official
regarding pending legislation, public policy or a government rule or
regulation.”216 Although corporations and free speech advocates
may raise issues based on the straightforward result of this
definition, the potentially unintended—but nonetheless likely—
results are of greatest concern.
For example, the Brennan Center Proposal would not
allow the host of The Colbert Report to spend time on his show to
discuss the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law in a way that might be
reasonably interpreted as encouraging the viewing public to
contact their government representatives.217 Certainly, the host of
the show is well-compensated, and Comedy Central along with its
corporate parent, Viacom, has spent more than $10,000 to produce
and air the show. Therefore, in a fair reading of the proposal’s text,
it would seem that this expenditure would need shareholder
approval.
Another example of this likely result could involve a
situation where a corporate leader speaks out on behalf of (or
in opposition to) proposed legislation. On March 27, 2009, chief
executive officers (CEOs) of the nation’s several major banks
met with President Obama at the White House.218 If there had
214

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010).
See Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 23,
(manuscript at 72). This may also be a problem with the other two proposals, although
their definitions are not clear enough for a proper analysis. This definitional problem
may also raise an issue of potential constitutional vagueness.
216
Id.
217
See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central Television broadcast Dec. 7,
2010), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/367669/
december-07-2010/poll-to-repeal-don-t-ask--don-t-tell.
218
Eamon Javers, Inside Obama’s Bank CEOs Meeting, POLITICO (Apr. 3,
2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/20871.html.
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been a press conference afterward and one or more of the CEOs
had spoken in support of a regulation or proposed legislation,
such speech may have constituted a violation of the proposal.
Although news networks may broadcast the message free of
charge, the CEO likely flew, at the company’s cost, on a very
expensive private plane to the White House and spent corporate
time and money preparing for the meeting and the press
conference. As long as the CEO speaks in his or her official
corporate role, the corporation pays him or her to deliver that
message. Again, a literal and straightforward reading of the
proposal yields results that go well beyond addressing
independent expenditures and are far broader than requirements
intended to protect the interest of the shareholders.
In addition to the Brennan Center Proposal’s
overinclusiveness, another aspect of the proposal is
underinclusive. The proposal does not cover charitable
contributions, independent charitable expenditures,219 or speech
supporting a charitable cause, all of which share many of the
same characteristics as independent political expenditures and
contain a similar risk of contravening shareholder interests. Like
independent political expenditures, charitable expenditures are
an activity in which “managers of publicly-traded companies
spend . . . using other people’s money—in part, money invested by
shareholders.”220 In addition, charitable expenditures are similar
to political expenditures, because they are unlikely directly
related to the products or services offered by the corporation. At a
high level, the aims of charitable and political expenditures are
similar—they impact arenas outside of the market in which the
corporation operates.221 If the Brennan Center Proposal covered
political expenditures while not regulating charitable
expenditures, then it would specifically single out political
expenditures for disfavor. Further, it would limit the scope of this
regulation so that it would not be broad enough and therefore
inappropriately tailored to the shareholder-protection interest.
219

The non-inclusion of independent charitable expenditures is potentially an
exception that could swallow the rule. Many political expenditures could be cast as
charitable expenditures, as can be seen in the complicated relationship (and overlap)
between 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations.
220
Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 18, at 9
(citation omitted).
221
See Gilson & Klausner, supra note 24 (“Typically [charitable contributions]
are uncontroversial, providing support to schools, art museums, United Way and the
like in communities where the corporation does business. A willful chief executive can
use corporate funds to make contributions to pet causes, but this type of behavior is
rare and, like other self-interested dealing, constrained by ordinary board oversight.”).
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Thus, the proposal is overinclusive because it would not
exempt media corporations and it would inhibit corporations
from undertaking typical public-policy advocacy. In addition,
the proposal is underinclusive because it would not regulate
charitable speech, contributions, or expenditures. As a result of
this over- and underinclusiveness, the Brennan Center
Proposal fails the “fit” analysis set forth in Citizens United, and
the Court is unlikely to find it “narrowly tailored” to the
shareholder-protection interest.
D.

Content-Neutrality Analysis

The “fit” analysis under Citizens United’s conception of
shareholder protection as a compelling governmental interest
is the most pertinent analytical tool available to critique the
mandatory shareholder-approval proposals. However, a
secondary constitutional argument may be made with regard to
the proposals; namely, they violate the content-neutrality
principle, a fundamental tenet of the First Amendment.222 The
seminal case Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley223
articulated the content-neutrality principle. In Mosley, a
protester challenged an ordinance that disallowed nonlabor
picketing, but allowed labor-related picketing, in front of
schools.224 The Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional
because it made an impermissible distinction between laborrelated picketing and other peaceful picketing.225 Further, the
Court stated that “the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”226
The mandatory shareholder-approval proposals violate
Mosley’s content-neutrality principle because they restrict only
certain speech based on content. For example, the proposals do
nothing to inhibit charitable speech or other types of speech that
may be unrelated to the products and services of the company.
These proposals would not require shareholder approval for
corporate management to spend money on contributions to
222

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (1994).
223
See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Although Mosley is a
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See Fallon, supra note 222, at 20.
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Id. at 94.
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charitable organizations, encourage the public to donate or
volunteer for charitable organizations, or even run advertisements
supporting corporate management’s favorite sports teams.227 Still,
when it comes to political speech, under these proposals, corporate
management would be required to seek shareholder approval and
follow very specific regulations. The Mosley Court prohibited
“[s]elective exclusions from a public form . . . based on content
alone,”228 such as the prohibition on running advertisements about
political issues without shareholder approval but allowing
advertisements about charitable or other pet causes without
restriction of any kind.
Although the content-neutrality analysis would vary
slightly between the three mandatory shareholder-approval
proposals, the main thrust of the proposals is identical.
Because “[a]ny restriction on expressive activity because of its
content . . . completely undercut[s] the ‘profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’”229 any
significant restriction of a corporation’s ability to make
independent political expenditures is impermissible under the
content-neutrality principle of the First Amendment. Because
Citizens United placed political speech at the core of the First
Amendment’s protection and Mosley identified the contentneutrality principle as fundamental, these proposals are ripe
for invalidation by the Court.
CONCLUSION
Many legislative and regulatory responses to Citizens
United have been proposed and the three mandatory
shareholder proposals discussed in this note are certainly
among the most well-intentioned and carefully constructed.
Although they would have the potential to ameliorate the
effects of Citizens United regarding independent political
expenditures by corporations, they run afoul of that very
decision’s interpretation of the First Amendment.
Even if the Court finds shareholder protection to be a
compelling governmental interest, none of the three proposals is
narrowly tailored to that interest. The shareholder democracy
227

While there may be limitations on such activities from corporate law, they
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and “fit” analysis, articulated with regard to the shareholderprotection interest in Citizens United, does not permit any of the
three mandatory shareholder-approval proposals to exist within
current First Amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the
proposals likely violate the content-neutrality rule by placing
significant burdens on corporations wishing to exercise their
political rights while failing to place similar restrictions on other
forms of corporate speech.
As a result of these constitutionally doomed proposals,
PepsiCo may uninhibitedly support a potential campaign by Mr.
Colbert for President in 2012 and similarly, Viacom will not have
to seek shareholder approval before airing an episode of The
Colbert Report that features Mr. Colbert’s candidacy.230 In the new
legal and constitutional landscape of Citizens United, corporations
have unprecedented constitutional protection for political
activities. Although scholars and legislators may continue to craft
creative responses, the barriers to restricting corporate political
speech remain stronger than ever.
Robert B. Sobelman
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